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If someone has a right, this means normally that it is wrong to 
hinder her or him from acting in accordance with this right, or at 
least that a person or an organisation who does so, requires very 
compelling reasons to justify their actions. Simply having a right 
to do something, however, does not preclude that it is wrong for 
her or him to do it, e.g. gambling. Conversely, there may be cases 
where the right thing for one person to do, does not imply a right, 
and therefore it is not wrctrig or unjust to hinder this action. “If our 
army captures an enemy soldier, we might say that the right thing 
for him to do is to try to escape, but it would not follow that it is 
wrong for us to try to stop him”1.
To have a right may mean that the government commits a 
breach of the law if it hinder s me to act this way2, or at least, again 
that this may be justified only under very extraordinary circum­
stances. Therefore, the individual right to resistance, to rebuff these 
kinds of measures, is not a new right, but rather the exercise of a 
right unlawfully denied. Obviously, the rights of different indivi­
duals may conflict with one another, and in this case, it is the task 
of a judge to balance the compering positions3; perhaps she will even 
have to make clear what the rights of those parties are4.
While these views characterize some of the central tenets Ro­
nald Dworkin argues for in his book Taking Rights Seriously, they 
also belong to Luis de Molina, as we shall see. A few years later 
Dworkin published a book entitled Law's Empire, and while he had
* University of Halle (Germany).
1 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press, Cam­
bridge / Mass., 1977 / 1978, p. 189. ;
2 Id., ibid., p. 192,
3 Ibid., pp. 193, 81 ff.
4 Ibid., p. 90.
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not changed his opinions, his conceptual point of departure had. 
Molina, on the other hand, remained true to his initial conceptual 
decision to use right as the pivotal concept of the first five volumes 
of his monumental De iustitia et iure. The reflections of different 
types of laws, on the other hand, filled the last 27 disputations of 
the fifth treatise, which is found in the sixth volume. In a certain 
sense his theory is, to use Dworkiris terminology, a more resolute 
“right-based-theory”. It takes neither duty nor policy as the focus 
of its considerations -  the alternatives Dworkin mentions5. This 
categorisation is justified at least as long as we proceed like Brian 
Tierny does in his text on Ockham6, i.e. speaking of rights without 
identifying rights immediately as liberty rights.
In this treatment, we will, therefore, explore the elements of such 
a rights-based theory and see that Dworkihs talk of rights as trumps 
may very well apply to Molina as well. Yet, this does not mean that 
we should declare him to be a liberal avant la lettre: first, he does not 
accept legal equality; second, he considers freedom to be something 
good, but by no means an inalienable right of every human being; 
third, because he has rather archaic views on capital punishment.
Nevertheless investigating to which extent he accepts the ina­
lienable rights of all men, including slaves and those who are going 
to become slaves, and even elucidates the legal means by which to 
sue for these rights, I will try to determine whether this kind of 
juridification implies a tendency towards legal equality and liberty. 
Furthermore, we may say that Molina uses some elements of the 
modern concept of human rights, although without combining them 
in the way we use them today.
But first we will have a look at the different interpretations of 
the term ‘Tight”, which is sometimes also specified as “subjective 
right” . This characterisation has to do with the fact that in the 
English translations of the continental terminology “Recht” “droit”, 
“diritto”, “derecho”, “direito” -in  which terminology the further spe­
cification of subjective and objective is necessary because in these 
languages there is no direct correspondence to the difference be­
tween “right” and “law” in English usage- was sometimes used to
5 Ibid., p. 172.
6 Brian Tierney, The Idea of Natural Rights. Studies on Natural Rights, 
Natural Law and Church Law, W. Eerdmans Publishing Company. Grand Rapids 
/ Mich. -  Cambridge / U.K. 1997.
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emphasize the novelty of the idea of an individual right7 8. One of the 
reasons why I think that we find in Luis de Molina's De lustitia et 
iure a right-based theory of the legal order, in which one effect of 
rights is limiting the power of state authorities, is his definition and 
use of the term ius. Although he is not using the term “subjective 
right", his definition comes very close to the one given by Gottlieb 
Achenwall, who seems to have been the first to speak of a ius su- 
biective sumtum in his Prolegomena iuris naturalist.
1. What is a Right?
There seems to be a remarkable difference concerning the inter­
est in questions on the nature of rights between the English-speak­
ing world and countries such as Germany, France and Italy. In 
Germany, for instance, one of the few outstanding scholars having 
dealt with the theory of rights maintained in his fundamental work 
on the topic in 1985 that, despite of the length and intensity of the 
debate, there is no agreement on the concept of (subjective) rights9. 
In the ensuing decades, a consensus regarding rights has still yet 
to be reached, however, there isn't an intense debate either. Most 
dictionaries of legal vocabulary define “right" in very broad terms as 
any kind of claim a natural or legal person may have referring to a 
legal order. A volume presenting a collection of texts on individual 
rights published in 2007 contains mostly translations of English or 
American texts10.
And while in the Anglo-Saxon world there is no consensus either, 
over the past few decades at least they have been engaged in an on­
going lively debate involving very prominent figures. At the begin­
ning of his 25 page-entry “Rights” in the Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Leif Wenar11 defines rights as ‘entitlements (not) to per­
form certain actions, or (not) to be in certain states; or entitlements 
that others (not) perform certain actions, or (not) be in certain states’. 
Just like many other scholars, such as Hillel Steiner, Peter Jones and
7 Annabel Brett, Liberty, Eight and Nature, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge 1997, pp. 2ff.
8 Gottlieb Achenwall, Prolegomena iuris naturalis, Bossigelus, Halle 31767.
9 Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt / M. 1985, p. 159.
10 Markus S. Stepanians (Hrsg.), Individuelle Rechte, Mentis, Paderborn 2007.
11 Leif Wenar, “Rights”, in: Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, last change 
2015, to be found under: plato.stanford.edu/ entries/rights/ (9/21/16).
22 MATTHIAS KAUFMANN
Christopher Morris12, Wenar uses the differentiation between the 
kinds of rights -  between claim, privilege, power and immunity — in­
vented or discovered, anyway presented by Wesley Hohfeld in 191313 
as an instrument of analysis with their correlatives, namely, duty, no­
claim, liability and disability. X mentioned this because there are still 
debates as to whether only claims are ‘real rights’ or whether rights 
should instead be understood as immunities against the assaults of 
legal authorities or others, some elements of both we find in Molina.
Another debate that is still carried out in the Anglo-American 
discourse is the one between choice or will theorists and interest 
theorists. It can be traced back to the German theorists of Roman 
Law in nineteenth century: Representatives of will theory held that 
a right gives a person a possibility to realize her will14, while their 
opponents believed that rights have to protect a person’s interests, 
whether she is aware of them or not15. Within the contemporary 
discussion, Joseph Raz may be seen as one of the most important 
defenders of interest theory, while H. L. A. Hart speaks of a person 
who holds a right as a “small scale sovereign”. Defenders of will or 
choice theory like Steiner and Jones often use the third party argu­
ment, according to which the person who has the benefit of a certain 
action by someone does not have necessarily a right to it: If Joäo 
orders a bunch of flowers for Maria in Ronaldo’s shop, then Maria 
will benefit from this order; however, it is not she who has the right 
to delivery but Joäo. The interest theorist’s answer is sometimes 
that it would be rather strange for us to say that new born babies 
cannot have a right to live. Jhering makes this point with reference 
to children and mentally ill people, and Molina defends the right 
of pueri et amentes to possess things as well. And Hart, normally 
seen as one of the leading representatives of a will theory, seems
12 Hiliel Steiner, An Essay on Rights, Blackwell, Oxford 1994, 6Inn.; Peter 
Jones, Rights, Palgrave, Houndsmills 1994, p, 69; Christopher Morris, “Some Ques­
tions about Rights”, in Andrei Marmo (ed.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy 
of Law, Routledge, London pp. 557-568.
13 Wesley N. Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning'*, Yale Law Journal (November 1913), digital version under: http:/ fwww. 
hiit.fi/ files /ns/Herkko/ (9/21 / 2016),
14 Bernhard Windscheid, Lehrbuch des Pandektenrechts, Ebner & Seubert 
Stuttgart, Band I, 51879, Buch II, Erstes Kapitel § 37, p. 92, defines right as “eine 
von der Rechtsordnung (Recht im objektiven Sinne, objektives Recht) verliehene 
Willensmacht oder Willensherrschaft konkreten Inhalts” .
13 Rudolf von Jhering, Der Geist des römischen Rechts auf den verschiedenen Stu­
fen seiner Entwicklung, Breitkopf und Härtel, Leipzig 31865, 3. Teil, 1. Abteilung, § 
60, p. 311: Rights are “legally protected interests” (“rechtlich geschützte Interessen”).
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to be ready to accept a different view regarding these cases16. In 
my view, the concept of right should be understood in terms of the 
idea of a family resemblance between the, different usages instead 
looking for a clear-cut definition.
There is another aspect in the contemporary discussion of rights 
that seems to be helpful for an adequate understanding of Molina’s 
position: Joel Feinberg declares that insisting on claims is the es­
sence of right and more useful than anything else when it comes to 
securing a person’s self respect and her respect towards others17. It 
may be difficult to verify this kind of moral psychology, and in the 
end Feinberg doesn’t rely on it either; however, it seems clear that 
the possibility for someone to be a bearer of rights, irrespective of 
the kind of rights, implies an element of recognition and approval 
not found in the same way in Feinberg’s Nowheresville, namely, 
a world in which there are no such rights. We will see that one of 
Molina’s merits seems to be that he accepts all human beings as 
such possible holders of rights.
2. Legal Theory as Doctrine of Right and Rights
Within his presentation of the different ways the term ius is 
used, Molina refers in a quite traditional manner to the “art of the 
good and the equal” (ars boni et aequi), to law as a general concept 
of which the law is one species and then arriving at a view of ius as 
a “faculty or empowerment a man has to something” (pro facultate 
potestateve quam ad aliquid homo habet)18. He continues in making 
the usual distinction between fields of law according their origin— 
whether they are divine or human, natural or posited19.
Molina then defines ius in the first disputation of the second 
tractate, as
“a faculty to do or have something or to maintain it or to behave
in any way such that if it is hindered without legitimate reason an
16 H. L. A. Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political 
Theory, Clarendon, Oxford 1982, pp. 162-194; 189.
17 Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty, Princeton Univer­
sity Press, Princeton / NJ 1980, pp. 148, 151n.
18 Luis de Molina, De iustitia et iure, ed. novissima, Moguntiae 1659, tract. 
I, disp. 2, n. 4.
19 Id., ibid., tract. I, disp. 4.
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injury is done to the person who has it. This way, that right, in this 
meaning, becomes something like a measure of injury: because as 
much as it is opposed and damaged without legitimate reason, injury 
is done to the one who has it”20.
Saying that an injury is committed to the holder of a right if this 
faculty is hindered allows Molina to integrate the will of the holder 
into his definition as well as the holder’s interests. At first glance 
it may seem to involve circular reasoning to explain right via the 
absence of injury; but upon closer inspection, it seems obvious that 
there is no more circularity in this than in speaking of an entitle­
ment as Wenar does in his definition. We must, however, be clear 
that for Molina this entitlement or empowerment may stem from 
very different kinds of law, including Roman Law, Church Law, 
Castilian and Portuguese law, but also from other national and 
regional laws and even natural law21. Normally, the entitlements 
given by rights -at least according to positive kinds of law- are more 
or less the same. Yet, sometimes there are differences, for instance, 
when according to Castilian law the heir receives the dominium 
over his inheritance only via his personal acceptance, while in Fran­
ce and some regions of Italy this is not necessary22.
According to this definition, a right offers some protection to its 
holder, and it may be seen as a trump in Dworkin’s sense, because 
any attempt to limit it has to be adequately justified. As legitimate 
reasons to interfere in such a right, Molina mentions situations of 
emergency, but also the entitlement of state authorities to protect 
the sanity and morals of their subjects via the regulation of customs 
of food and clothing23. And while not every exercise of such rights, 
e.g. those involving habits of eating or clothing, can be interpreted 
acts of justice, every illegitimate limitation of a right is certainly an 
injury. This is even true in cases where a person does things that 
are not good for her.
An interesting example of this can be found in Molina fifth 
treatise when he deals with the effects or virtues {virtutes) of law ac-
20 Ibid., 0,1,1: “Est facultas aliquid faciendi, sive obtinendi, aut in eo insisten- 
di, vel aliquo modo se habenti, cui si, sine legitima causa, contraveniatur, iniuria fit 
earn habenti. Quo fit, ut ius in hac acceptione sit quasi censura iniuriae; quantum 
enim ei, sine legitima causa contravenitur & praeiudicatur, tantum fit iniuriae”.
21 Ibid., 11,2,3.
22 Ibid., 11,3,18.
23 Ibid., 11,1,2.
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cording to Herennius Modestinus, i.e. prescription, prohibition, per­
mission and punishment, especially in his treatment of permission. 
This is, because human law contains large parts of natural law, but 
it adds a large part of what is only positive law of the respective 
state. Therefore, many times and for good reasons, state law per­
mits things that are contrary to natural law. Molina mentions the 
example of public prostitution, because man’s weakness means that 
not all kinds of fornication can be excluded and the allowance of 
prostitution prevents even worse forms of fornication, i.e. adultery. 
This permission implies that the prostitute necessarily must have 
a right to receive her wage. This example as well as others like the 
killing of an unfaithful wife and her lover by the horned husband 
are to be understood in terms of a prohibition on the part of public 
authorities to interfere, whether by hindrances or punishment, in 
such matters. Molina generally states that a legal permission im­
plies a legal incapacity for state authorities and perhaps justifies 
legal claims of acting persons, be it towards state authorities or 
towards other individuals24.
As we can see, in Molina’s work we find the idea of an individual 
right to restrict the power of authorities in certain cases. This does 
not include a general human right of protection against state power, 
at least in the above-mentioned cases where the behaviour to be 
protected is contrary to natural law and only condoned in order to 
protect against an even greater evil. However, if we consider this 
together with what he says just after the passage quoted earlier, 
we can conclude that there must be some kind of right to the per­
mission of things, as long as they are not contrary to natural law25. 
For example, it is not the task of the secular state to punish inner 
acts, because this is a matter for God, and these inner acts as such 
will not harm the state26. Since this kind of permission opens up a 
certain space in which the individual may act according to its pre­
ferences and, in early versions, can already be found in the texts of 
12th century canonists, some authors see parallels to a choice theory 
of rights, to Hart’s “small scale sovereign”27. We will explore several 
interesting examples for both interpretations of rights in the next 
section, thus confirming the idea that it is not helpful to enforce a 
decision between the two interpretations of rights.
24 Ibid., V,46,26.
25 Ibid., 11,1,3.
36 Ibid., V,46,26.
27 Brian Tierney, Natural rights, 49nn.
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Here, I would like to note that Molina is also aware of the case 
in which a person acts, in a certain sense, correctly, yet we still do 
not give her the right to do so. A non-Christian slave, captured as 
a prisoner of war in a war which is not obviously just from the part 
of the victor, does not commit an injury if he tries to flee. Despite 
this situation, we are nevertheless allowed to prevent his escape28.
As the discussion on the rights over slaves leads to the question 
whether one man can be the possession of another man, we will have 
to look at Molina's special use of the term dominium, which was 
very central to the natural law debate on rights for five centuries.
3. The Concept of dominium -  and the Limits of dominium
Molina's way to deal with this pivotal term -  which primarily 
covers the right to use something that we already have at our dis­
posal — aims at clarifying which are the particular rights involved 
and which are the limits. On the whole, it can be seen as part of a 
conceptual strategy. Molina follows Bartolus of Sassoferrato, de­
fining dominium as “the right to completely manage a corporeal 
thing, unless the law forbids it"29. It seems better not to translate 
the term, because the ambivalence in its meaning between “prop­
erty” and “domination” played an important role in the debates at 
least since the Franciscan poverty controversy in the 13th century. 
Annabel Brett has shown that Franciscans were able to use this 
to further their aims30, but obviously Pope John XXII also made 
use of this confusion in arguments directed against the Franciscan 
position. Later authors like Molina made a distinction between the 
dominium proprietatis and the dominium iurisdictionis. From a 
political point of view, this difference is essential: Whereas a slave 
is the master’s property, and his master has dominium proprietatis 
over him, a prince can rule his citizens only via dominium iurisdic­
tionis with mutual rights and obligations.
Binding dominium with reference to law, be it positive or 
natural law, may look trivial at first glance, but it is strategic
28 Luis de Molina, De iustitia et iure, 11,37,10.
29 Id, ibid., 11,3,1: “ius perfecte disponendi de re corporal!, nisi lege prohibitur” . 
For a more complete discussion of Molina’s view of dominium, see Jorg Alejandro 
Tellkamp, “Rights and Dominium”, in Matthias Kaufmann -  Alexander Aichele 
(eds.), A Companion to Luis de Molina, Brill, Leiden ~ Boston 2014, pp. 125-154.
30 Annabel Brett, Liberty, Right and Nature, I2nn.
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insofar as it limits the power to dispose over things, e.g. the ius 
destruendi of the owner, which Molina accepts to a certain extent for 
physical things31, as well as the right to alienate them32. Therefore, 
individual capabilities to legal actions are also limited by the rights 
of others. Molina does not completely share Bartolus’ view on 
dominium, because for him it is not a species of right, but rather 
a legal position connected to a bundle of rights33. The formula of a 
bundle of rights can also be found, interestingly enough, in Robert 
Alexy’s description of subjective rights34.
As we just mentioned, the laws by which the dominium is limi­
ted may be quite different. Because God is the creator and master 
of everything, including life and integrity of persons, every human 
dominion is subordinated to his dominion over the universe. This 
includes limitations of the rights of persons over their lives and 
their integrity, of which they are custodians (custodes) but not mas­
ters, and of the rights of rulers over their subordinates, even if they 
have a dominium proprietatis over them: A master must not kill or 
mutilate his slave and must not prevent him from marrying35. Such 
measures would represent an injury to the slave, and according to 
the definition provided above even a slave obviously has the right 
to life and to the integrity of his body.
According to natural law, men are the masters of all the things 
under the sky, including light. But for this kind of dominium, it is 
enough for man to use them as he wills in the way nature provided 
us with them and in a way that is neither in opposition to human 
nor divine law36. Accordingly, not only the lives of human beings 
under someone’s rule are excluded from destruction, but also 
everything that is relevant to the maintenance of others and of 
all the life in the universe such that its destruction would cause 
damage to them, like the destruction of natural species. Noah, 
for instance, had the opportunity to inflict such damage, but he 
did not have the right to do so37. While this view might possess
31 Luis de Molina, De iustitia et iure, 111,1,1.
32 Id., ibid., 11,2,16.
33 Ibid., 11,3,5.
34 Robert Alexy, Theorie der Grundrechte, p. 224.
35 Luis de Molina, De iustitia et iure, 11,18,5-7.
36 Id,, ibid., 11,18,13: “ad dominium satis est facultas pro arbitratu eis utendi 
ad usus, ad quos natura contulit nobis res & ad usus, qui lege divina vel humana 
non sunt prohibiti” .
37 Ibid.
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an “ecological” aura today, it is meant as a limit for the right of 
destruction (¿ws destruendi) normally connected to dominium and 
is generally accepted by Molina when it comes to corporeal things38. 
Those who destroy things of this kind, which are in their property, 
act amorally, hut they do not breach natural law. Within the fields 
just mentioned, however, the rights of the proprietary fall under 
serious limitations, partially by natural law, partially by divine 
positive law39. His definition of dominium allows Molina, therefore, 
to apply the concept in a univocal manner within a relatively wide 
range of situations, while submitting dominion over certain kinds 
of property to severe restrictions by natural and positive law. The 
reasons for such restrictions are the rights of others which are or 
which might be violated. This becomes especially relevant when it 
comes to the legal treatment of slaves.
This means that neither the State nor its sovereigns, the princes, 
possess dominium over the external goods of their subjects and a 
forteriori over their life and limbs. Molina repeatedly affirms not 
only that he has demonstrated this point on several occasions, but 
also that it has been shown to be the case by others as well as that it 
is plain to see that it is confirmed by experience40. In this context he 
again explains in the initial part of the third treatise that man is not 
entitled to kill or mutilate himself because his body does not belong 
to him but to God, even though it has to be mentioned that a mutual 
relationship with God is not possible because man is not able to give 
Him anything that could be considered adequate. And it is in this 
sense that such violations of privileges that belong to God go beyond 
injustice because there is no way for them to be compensated41.
Nevertheless, man has been given life and a body to enjoy them 
and to use his limbs in various functions. As long as he respects 
the limitations just mentioned, he may do with his body whatever 
he wants, and anyone who hinders him in doing so does injustice 
to him in much the same sense as someone who wants to mutilate 
or kill him42. Since man is inserted as custodian of his own life 
and body, it is neither permissible to amputate one of his limbs for 
medical reasons if he resists nor force him into some other medical 
treatment. The situation is different if parents or a tutor have to
38 Ibid., Ill, 1,1.
39 Ibid., 1,2,1.
40 Ibid., 11,25; 10,1,8.
41 Ibid., 111,1,1.
42 Ibid., 01,1,4.
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take care of him, or if he has to obey a prelate who makes the deci­
sions concerning his flourishing and well-being43. In such cases the 
right to protection of the relevant person’s interest is pivotal. Thou­
gh it is clearly anachronistic to speak of autonomy in this context, 
it is remarkable the extent to which Molina insists on the will of 
the involved persons and where he sets the limits. Because human 
beings possess the various faculties over which they may dispose 
freely as they see fit, they can lend the use of these to someone else 
or furnish their body to matrimonial use within marriage44.
It is especially in the realm of dominium, which seems at first 
glance so unlimited and uncontrollable, that the limits of domina­
tion and the limits for lawful action at the individual and public 
levels are given by the rights of those who are submitted to these 
activities. This holds also for slaves, because the right of the master 
over his slave is limited insofar as the master commits an injustice 
to the slave, for example, if he takes his life, damages his limbs 
or his health, which of course belong to his life. He is even less so 
master over the slave’s salvation45, and he can be sued at the town 
prefect if he treats him cruelly46. Moreover, if a female slave is abu­
sed by her master, the bishop can manumit her47. Since according to 
his definition, “right [...] becomes [...] a measure of injury: because 
as much as it is opposed and damaged without legitimate reason, 
injury is done to the one who has it”. We may inversely conclude 
that if injury is done to a slave as the result o f a certain form of 
treatment, then this is a violation of his right.
But individual rights also comprise a limit for competences of 
authorities, as it was pointed out earlier. Again and again, Molina 
insists that there is an essential difference between how God rules 
the world, without having any obligations towards it, and the power 
of human kings, which is in no way unlimited48. He considers monar­
43 Ibid., 111,1,10.
44 Ibid., 111,1,5. It is interesting to see the similarities and differences to Kant’s 
definition of marriage in the Metaphysics of Morals -  Doctrine of Right, § 24.
45 Luis de Molina, De iustitia et iure, 11,38,2: “Licet autem ius dominorum in 
servos tam late pateat, non tamen se extendit ad eorum vitam, cuius dominium 
sibi soli Deus reservavit, atque adeo neque ad membra & salutem mancipii, quae 
quasi partes quaedam vitae illius sunt, a quibus vita ipsa pendet; & multo minus 
se extendit ad salutem illius spiritualem”.
46 Id., ibid., 11,38,3.
47 Ibid., 11,39.
48 Ibid., V,46.5; V,46,12,
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chy to be the best form of a State because it is more successful than 
the other forms in keeping the peace and maintaining tranquility49. 
Yet he makes it clear that citizens have a right to resistance as soon 
as the king tries to exercise any kind of power not conceded to him 
by the people50: The extension of the ruler’s power is something that 
has to be negotiated. The king may use the power that was conferred 
to him by the people and the political community, for instance, via 
customary law. A prince intending to act unjustly may even be killed 
in individual self-defence or even in defence of the State51.
There are a number of hints in previous text that Molina’s 
theory of rights shows a number of similarities to later liberal posi­
tions, and not only because some libertarians and representatives of 
the Austrian School of National Economy explicitly make reference 
to him. Now it seems quite trivial that a 16th century Jesuit cannot 
be a liberal in the modern sense, and we will confirm this by looking 
at a few different arguments. Nevertheless, there are also elements 
in this theory that would be described as liberal today, and genera­
lly speaking his tendency to subject the things under discussion to 
the logic of legal argument that exerted a certain pressure in this 
direction and had visible effects decades and even centuries later.
Typically, liberalism-in many of its guises-represents a rejection 
of “unnecessary” cruel punishment, of any kind of arbitrary exercise 
of power; furthermore, it propagates the idea that all men are prima 
facie equal, which implies the postulation of equality before the law, 
the view that liberties should not be limited without necessity and, 
in the end, the idea that liberty is an inalienable human right.
With respect to punishment Molina emphasizes several times 
the principle nulla poena sine lege, i.e. the rejection of arbitrari­
ness52, yet he insists, contrary to the Waldensians, that the State is 
permitted to kill malefactors53 and, contrary to John Duns Scotus, 
that it may do so without God’s dispense even for minor offences 
such as theft or adultery54. He justifies this with a reference to 
Divus Thomas and to a rather bloodcurdling version of the orga­
nism-metaphor for human society55. Contrary to Kant, however,
49 Ibid., 11,23,14.
50 Ibid., 11,23,10.
51 Ibid., 111,1,6.
52 Ibid., 111,39,2; III,21.
53 Ibid., 111,5,1.
54 Ibid., 111,5,2.
55 Ibid., 111,5,3.
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he does not insist that anyone who has committed murder must 
die; instead, he also accepts deportation, exile or even a forfeiture, 
if it is very high and connected with other forms of punishment56.
If we look at the criteria of equality and liberty, we first have 
to see that Molina explicitly rejects equality before the law, saying 
that the social position is relevant for the evaluation of a crime; the­
refore, the guilt increases or decreases in relation to it57. But if we 
look more closely at this passage and how he tries to differentiate 
between justified and unjustified slavery, we arrive at something 
along the lines of being treated as an equal: all relevant aspects are 
taken into consideration, even if there are differences concerning 
the view of what is relevant.
4. Concluding Remarks
Concerning liberty, Molina .accepts the view that by mere na­
ture in statu innocentiae all men are free; this means, he does not 
accept the Aristotelian thesis, defended in the 16th century by Juan 
Ginés de Sepúlveda and others, that there are slaves by nature. 
Those who are not intelligent enough to manage their own lives 
have to be led, but to their own advantage and not exclusively to 
the advantage of their master. But under certain circumstances the 
introduction of slavery by the law of nations was justified. Legitima­
te titles included both being taken prisoner in a war that was just 
from the winning side and selling oneself into servitude because 
man has dominium over his own freedom. While selling oneself 
without urgent necessity is a sin, worse than selling one's property 
or honour, the contract is nevertheless valid58. In 16th and 17th cen­
tury some authors held the position—later taken up by Locke, for 
instance—that an individual’s liberty is God’s property, therefore,
56 Ibid., 111,22,4.
57 Ibid., 1,13,2: “eo quod ex qualitate personae offensae et offendentis accrescat 
aut decrescat culpa”.
58 Molina De iustitia et iure, Disp. 33, coi. 162: ‘'Tertius titulus est emptio et 
vepditio. Ponendum in primis est, hominem, sicut non solum externorum suroum 
bonorum, sed etiam proprii honoris & famae est dominus [...] sic etiam dominum 
esse suae libertatis, atque adeo stando, in solo iure naturali; posse eam alienare, 
seque in servitudinem redigere Si tamen quis suae libertatis prodigus esset, 
absque rationabili causa se servituti subiiciens, non minus imo magis peccaret, 
quam si non solum pecuniarum sed etiam honoris et famae [...] esset prodigus”.
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cannot be validly sold by the individual. But, on the other hand, 
the philosopher and jurist Heineccius, from Halle, still accepted 
Molina’s titles of enslavement in his natural law theory stemming 
from 1738. It is Rousseau who states that we do not have the right 
to give up legal responsibility via self-enslavement, insisting that 
liberty is an unalienable right59.
Obviously, there are many reasons why it is not helpful to speak 
of Molina as a liberal avant la lettre. Nevertheless, the way he exp­
lains how legal permissions form a hindrance for interventions by 
authorities (even in the case of prostitution), how the distinction 
between dominium proprietatis and dominium iurisdictionis limits 
the power of kings, and how he concedes the right to life and to 
physical integrity to slaves and even speaks of their ius qua homo 
-although not in our sense of human rights- shows how he comes 
close to the modern concepts of right. The role of slaves is of special 
importance, for Molina gives the first comprehensive account of the 
theory and practice of the modermslave trade as well as a detailed 
argument regarding the situations in which it is not justified. His 
arguments are used by the Consejo de las Jndias for the justification 
of slavery as well as by some authors who are critics of it, e.g. Diego 
de Avendano.
RESUMEN
El concepto de derecho de Luis de Molina muestra semejanzas con 
aspectos del pensamiento de R. Dworkin. En general, el discurso moderno es 
útil para realizar un análisis adecuado de la teoría legal basada en derechos 
de Molina, la cual, a su vez, se revela como moderna. Por ello algunos 
elementos del debate presente sobre derechos, por ejemplo entre teóricos 
de la elección y teóricos del interés, son discutidos con referencia a Molina 
demostrando de qué modo él hace uso del ius en el sentido de derecho como 
base de su teoría legal. Un papel central se otorga al concepto de dominium, 
que ayuda a clarificar qué derechos pueden tener los seres humanos y 
dónde están sus límites. Ah mismo tiempo, la manera como Molina usa 
ese término también limita el poder de las autoridades humanas sobre 
individuos, sin reivindicar un derecho humano a la libertad inalienable: la 
libertad de una persona pertenece a su dominium, por lo tanto ella puede 
venderse a sí misma como esclava en ciertas circunstancias.
59 J.-J. Rousseau, Contrat Social (1762), Gallimard, Paris 1964,1, 4.
